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Abstract:   
We develop and estimate a generalized labour supply model that incorporates work 
effort into the standard consumption-leisure trade-off. We allow workers a choice 
between two contracts: a piece rate contract, wherein he is paid per unit of service 
provided, and a mixed contract, wherein he receives an hourly wage and a reduced 
piece rate. This setting gives rise to a non-convex budget set and an efficient budget 
constraint (the upper envelope of contract-specific budget sets). We apply our model to 
data collected on specialist physicians working in the Province of Quebec (Canada). Our 
data set contains information on each physician’s labour supply and their work effort 
(clinical services provided per hour worked). It also covers a period of policy reform 
under which physicians could choose between two compensation systems: the 
traditional fee-for-service, under which physicians receive a fee for each service 
provided, and mixed remuneration, under which physicians receive a per diem as well 
as a reduced fee-for-service. We estimate the model using a discrete choice approach. 
We use our estimates to simulate elasticities and the effects of ex ante reforms on 
physician contracts. Our results show that physician services and effort are much more 
sensitive to contractual changes than is their time spent at work. Our results also 
suggest that a mandatory reform, forcing all physicians to adopt the mixed remuneration 
system, would have had substantially larger effects on physician behaviour than those 
observed under the voluntary reform. 
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1 Introduction
Empirical labour-supply models have played an important role in economic policy analysis. Sim-
ulations from these models have been used to measure and predict the effects of tax, welfare and
social policies on labour-force participation and hours worked in the economy. Examples include
Heckman (1974); Hausman (1980); Hoynes (1996); Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998); see Blun-
dell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey. The parallel, but related, empirical contracting literature has
focussed on the effect of monetary incentives on effort and productivity (Paarsch and Shearer, 2000;
Shearer, 2004), paying attention to the endogenous choice of a compensation system on the part
of agents (Lazear, 2000) and heterogeneous responses to incentives (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2003).
Generalized models, which incorporate effort decisions into traditional labour-supply models, al-
low for a richer policy evaluation environment, particularly in settings where productivity is not
proportional to time spent at work. Such models can be used to measure and predict the effects of
wages and contracts on hours worked and productivity, capturing responses that may be missed in
traditional models; they also permit cost and welfare comparisons across contracts.2 Yet, to date,
little attempt has been made to combine contracting models with labour-supply models in empir-
ical work.3 This paper addresses this issue. We develop and estimate a generalized labour-supply
model using a unique data set on physicians’ practice behaviour.
Physician behaviour is well-suited to analysis within a generalized model. Physicians can affect
both their time spent at work and the volume of services that they provide while at work through
effort (McGuire, 2000). Recent estimates of time-based labour supply elasticities have been provided
by Showalter and Thurston (1997) and Baltagi, Bratberg, and Holma˚s (2005).4 Estimates of the
effects of compensation policies on physician behaviour have been provided by Gruber and Owings
(1996) and Devlin and Sarma (2008). Our approach allows us to measure these effects within the
context of a parsimonious economic model and to measure the effects of contracts on the time spent
1The authors thank the Colle`ge des me´decins du Que´bec for making its survey data available and the Re´gie d’assurance-
maladie du Que´bec and Marc-Andre´ Fournier for the construction of the database. This article was partly written while
Fortin and Shearer were visiting the University Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne. We thank participants at the Maurice Marc-
hand Meeting in Health Economics (Lyon), the CIRPE´E Workshop on Applied Micro-Econometrics (Que´bec), the ADRES
workshop on the Econometric Evaluation of Public Policies (Paris), the Canadian Economics Association (Montre´al), the
European Workshop on Econometrics and Health Economics (Thessalonique), the European Economic Association (Vi-
enna) and the Econometric Society Winter Meeting (Chicago). We also thank seminar participants at CREST, the Free
University of Amsterdam and Paris-Dauphine University. We are grateful to Michel Truchon as well as Bruno Cre´pon,
Arnaud Dellis, Brigitte Dormont, Pierre-Yves Geoffard, Guy Laroque, Pierre-Thomas Le´ger and Marie-Claire Villeval for
useful discussions and comments. We acknowledge research support from the Canadian Institute of Health Research
(CIHR) and the Canada Research Chair in Social Policies and Human Resources at the Universite´ Laval.
2Ferrall and Shearer (1999); Margiotta and Miller (2000); Paarsch and Shearer (2009); Copeland and Monnet (2009)
are among those who have implemented empirical contracting models to investigate the welfare properties of different
contracts and the cost of moral hazard within the firm.
3One important exception is Dickinson (1999) who analyses a model incorporating on- and off-the-job leisure, that is
tested using controlled laboratory experiments.
4The effect of incentives on physicians’ choice of location has also been analysed within the context of the labour
supply model (Bolduc, Fortin, and Fournier, 1996)).
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per service, a suggested measure of health-care quality (Ma and McGuire, 1997).5 It also allows us
to generalize treatment-effect estimates to predict the effects of compensation policies ex-ante6 and,
in some cases, to make welfare comparisons across contracts.
We develop a simple model which we use to motivate and develop our general approach. We
specify utility as a function of consumption, hours of work and effort (measured by the volume of
services produced per hour of work). Contracts are composed of an hourly wage rate and a piece
rate per unit of service provided. The marginal return on an hour of work is thus endogenous and
depends on effort. Similarly, the marginal return on effort depends on hours of work. These nonlin-
ear prices are similar to those obtained in quantity/quality models (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Some
comparative static results are derived; we show that the compensated (hicksian) supply curves of
hours and services are positively sloped in the wage rate and the piece rate, respectively. In a more
realistic model, the worker has the choice between two contracts: one composed uniquely of a piece
rate and another composed of a wage rate per hour worked and a reduced piece rate. We show that
this environment gives rise to a non-convex budget set, from which we derive an efficient budget
constraint (the upper envelope of the contract-specific budget constraints).
We apply our model to the practice behaviour of specialist physicians working in the Province
of Quebec (Canada) between the years 1996-2002. All these physicians work within the Quebec
public Health-Care System. Our data contain information on individual physician labour supply
(weekly hours spent seeing patients, weekly hours spent performing administrative tasks or teach-
ing, and weeks worked per year) as well as the number of services provided by each physician per
year. The observation period also spans an important reform in physician compensation which we
exploit to identify our model. Prior to 1999, most specialist physicians in Quebec (92%) were paid
fee-for-service (FFS) public contracts, receiving a fee for each service provided. In 1999, the gov-
ernment introduced a mixed remuneration (MR) scheme, under which physicians received a per
diem, paid per hour worked, and a reduced fee-for-service. A notable aspect of the reform was its
voluntary nature; from the time the mixed compensation system was introduced, two sub-samples
of physicians are observed: those who adopt the MR system and those who remain under the FFS
system. We exploit this change in the compensation system to identify the physicians’ preference
parameters.
To estimate the model, we assume that preferences are (directly) independent of the compensa-
tion system. This implies that rational, unconstrained physicians will locate on the efficient budget
constraint – the budget constraint that maximizes a physician’s income for each possible combi-
nation of practice variables in his choice set. We derive the efficient budget constraint from our
knowledge of the physician’s contracts. We pay careful attention to the complications created by
5Recent empirical work suggests that compensation policies do influence physician behaviour in these directions
(Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer, 2008).
6See Marschak (1953); Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), and Todd and Wolpin (2008) for a discussion of ex-ante policy
evaluation.
3
the institutional constraints imposed on these contracts within the Quebec Health-Care System (e.g.,
income ceilings, regionally differentiated remuneration, constraints on the choice of the compensa-
tion system at the individual level). The simultaneous modelling of the allocation of time, work
intensity and institutional constraints introduces strong nonlinearities into the budget constraint.
To account for these nonlinearities in estimation, we discretize the choice set available to physi-
cians (Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton, 1980). This methodology is relatively free of restrictions
(MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990), imposing only that the marginal utility of income is positive
(van Soest, 1995).
We then solve for the utility-function parameters that generate the observed practice patterns
as optimal choices along the efficient budget constraint. To account for selection we allow for het-
erogeneity in preferences (both observable and unobservable), estimating a mixed-logit model (Mc-
Fadden and Train, 2000). To minimize the effects of functional forms on our results, we use a flexible
(quadratic) utility function, which can be viewed as a second-order approximation to the true utility
function. In order to limit computational time in estimation and to reduce the problem of hetero-
geneity in the nature of services provided, we restricted our sample to one speciality –pediatrics.
This specialty provides high variability in the participation in MR – 44% of pediatricians opted for
MR in the year 2000 as compared with 31% for all specialities. The voluntary nature of the reform
further complicates estimation, for the following reason. The decision to adopt MR was not indi-
vidual specific, but determined at the department level within hospitals.7 Consequently, individual
physicians could be constrained in their choice of a compensation system. Accounting for con-
straints on choice leads to a mixture of likelihoods wherein the probability of being constrained is
estimated along with the other parameters.
Elasticities and the effects of policy reforms are simulated through changing appropriate pa-
rameters of the budget constraint and allowing physicians to re-optimize. Our results suggest that
labour supply (weekly hours and weeks) elasticities are quite small while the (compensated) elas-
ticities of effort and services with respect to the fee per service are much stronger, being estimated at
about 0.3 and 0.4 respectively. Non-clinical hours (spent on administrative and teaching activities),
that are not remunerated under a FFS contract, are quite sensitive to compensated changes in the fee
per service, with an elasticity of -0.4. Our results also suggest that the changes in incentives brought
about by the 1999 reform strongly affected physician behaviour. Services completed decreased by
9% and non-clinical hours increased by 30%. What is more, work effort decreased, suggesting that
the quality of care may have increased (more time spent per service). A mandatory reform, forcing
all physicians to work under MR, would have reduced services by 15% and increased non-clinical
hours by 50%. However, these larger effects are not due to unobserved heterogeneity and selection,
but rather to the constraints placed on individual choice in the observed reform.
7Members of each department (groups of specialists working in the same field) would vote on the adoption of MR;
adoption required unanimous approval.
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The reform was also costly. Payments to physicians increase by over 9%. This is due to the
large per diem that physicians were paid for working under MR. We investigate the welfare effects
of constant-cost contracts under voluntary participation in MR. Under such circumstances services
provided would decrease relative to the fee-for-service contract by 6.47%. Yet the welfare impli-
cations are inconclusive: clinical hours worked would decrease by only 1.72% and time spent per
service would increase by 4.83%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model that we will
use in this paper. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the fee-for-service and mixed re-
muneration systems and derives the physician’s budget constraint. Section 4 presents our data and
summary statistics. Section 5 adapts the model of Section 2 to the institutional details of the Que´bec
reform and develops our empirical model. Section 6 describe our empirical results and the policy
simulations. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 A generalized model of labour supply
We present a static model of labour supply behaviour under linear contracts. Our model allows
for decisions over hours of work and effort. Our goal is to motivate our empirical analysis and
our estimation strategy within a simplified setting. Later we will adapt the model to fit the specific
institutional details of physician labour supply in Quebec.
Preferences are represented by the strictly quasi-concave and twice-differentiable utility func-
tion
U(X, h, e), (1)
where X is consumption, h is hours of work, and e is effort. We assume
UX > 0, Uh < 0, Ue < 0. (2)
Effort is determined by the number of services, A, performed per hour of work; we have8
A = eh. (3)
In some settings, time spent per service can be taken as a measure of quality of services – Ma and
McGuire (1997) have suggested such a measure in the case of physicians. This amounts to = 1/e
8One interpretation of (3) is a (Cobb-Douglas) production function. In a more general model this function could be
written as A = A(e, h; z), with e denoting a measure of effort such as the ratio of effective hours of work to hours at work
and z¯ denoting an exogenous vector of inputs that affect the marginal productivity of effort and hours worked. This
could be decomposed into two sub-matrices: z1 containing physical capital (e.g., hospital equipment) and z2 containing
human capital, or personal, characteristics ((e.g., age, experience). Such a specification would also allow for more complex
substitution patterns between effort and hours (perhaps due to fatigue).
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in our model, changes in which are a valid measure of changes in time spent providing services if
on-the-job leisure is fixed.9
The budget constraint is given by
X = wh + pA + y, (4)
where X is consumption (the price of which being normalized to one), w is the wage rate, p is the
fee per unit of service and y is non-labour income. Variation in w and p are treated as exogenous.10
Note that the budget constraint, (4), is general enough to account for many contracts of interest:
setting w = 0 and p > 0 gives the FFS contract, setting w > 0 and p > 0 gives a mixed contract,
while setting (w > 0 and p = 0) gives a fixed-wage contract.
We assume complete and symmetric information. This is a direct consequence of the fact that
effort is the ratio of two observable variables: hours worked and services completed.11 What is
more, we assume that the worker has complete control over his practice variables – freely choosing
both his hours of work and his clinical services.12
In its most general form, our model combines traditional labour supply analysis with a piece-
rate model, giving rise to non-linear (and endogenous) prices in the budget constraint. This can
be seen by substituting (3) into (4), adding and subtracting peh, and rearranging. This gives X =
(w + pe)h + (ph)e + yv, where yv = y − phe is the virtual non-labour income. It follows that the
marginal return to an hour of work (w+ pe) depends on the physician’s choice of effort – the number
of services that can be performed in that hour. Similarly, the marginal return to effort (ph) depends
on the physician’s hours of work. Since effort changes the number of services performed per hour,
the return to effort depends on the number of hours worked. These nonlinear prices are similar to
those obtained in quantity/quality models (Becker and Lewis, 1973).
The nonlinear prices give rise to a non-convex budget set (see Appendix A.3). The second-order
conditions for optimal behaviour require that the curvature of indifference surfaces be more pro-
nounced than the curvature of the budget set. We assume this to be the case and denote the optimal
solution (X★, h★, e★). In Appendix A.4 we show that (X★, h★, e★) is equivalent to (X′, h′, A′/h′) which
maximizes the transformed utility:
u(X, h, A) (5)
9This ensures that workers with higher values of 1/e do not simply take longer breaks between services.
10This is consistent with the public health-care system in Quebec. See Feldstein (1970) for an analysis that incorporates
the price-setting behaviour of physicians in a market-based environment.
11Agency problems and moral hazard could be introduced by incorporating random elements into the production
function, perhaps due to differences in the difficulty of tasks or in the marginal utility of on-the-job leisure.
12Within the context of models of physician behaviour this rules out constraints to supply or any demand shocks
that might affect a physician’s practice, allowing us to concentrate on the supply side of the medical market which
considerably simplifies the empirical analysis. It seems reasonable within the context of a public health-care system such
as in Quebec where long waiting lists for physicians’ services render the demand side of the market relatively passive.
Excess demand also reduces any incentive of physicians for demand inducement, which we also ignore.
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subject to
X− pA− wh = y,
where (5) is obtained by substituting e = A/h directly into the utility function (1): u(X, h, A) =
U(X, h, A/h) . Hence we can identify the parameters determining optimal behaviour using either
program: Max (1) s.t. (3) and (4), or Max (5) s.t. (4). In most of the following, we concentrate
on the transformed program. One advantage is that all arguments of the transformed utility are
well-defined over the whole choice set; effort is not defined in (1) when hours are set to zero.
The non-linearities in the budget constraint complicate the comparative statics of the model. For
example, an increase in non-labour income, y, will affect the worker’s choices of effort and hours
of work through two channels: the first is the standard income effect, the second is through its
impact on the endogenous marginal returns to effort and hours of work. Some results are possible,
however. In particular, the fact that the budget constraint is linear in A and h implies that the
expenditure function is concave in w and p; hence,
∂h˜
∂w
≥ 0; ∂A˜
∂p
≥ 0, (6)
where˜indicates that the partial is compensated. Notice however that concavity of the expenditure
function does not allow us to sign cross-partial derivatives; hence,
∂h˜
∂p
>
<
0. (7)
Similarly, since effort is the ratio of services to hours worked, its compensated partial derivative
with respect to p depends on
∂A˜
∂p
− A˜ ∂h˜
∂p
(8)
which is also unsigned. These results follow from a straight-forward application of duality theory to
the problem of maximizing (5) s.t. (4); we include a derivation in Appendix A.5 for completeness.13
2.1 Endogenous Compensation Choice
Introducing the choice of a compensation system complicates the analysis somewhat. We consider
two cases: a fee-for-service (FFS), or piece rate, system (X = pA) and a mixed compensation (MR)
system (X = wh+ αpA), where α < 1 denotes the discount rate on the fee-for-service payment (set-
ting α = 0 gives a fixed-wage compensation system). To proceed we note that UX > 0. Moreover,
13Similar results are shown in Edlefsen (1981, 1983) using the Hessian matrix from the original maximization problem.
Edlefsen (1981) also shows that a compensated increase in the fee per unit of service will increase both effort and hours
of work under a FFS system (p > 0 and w = 0) or a MR system where w is small, if leisure at work (or −e) and
leisure outside of work (or −h) are both net substitutes with respect to consumption. Using a somewhat different model,
Dickinson (1999) also finds that the effect of a compensated increase in the piece-rate on hours of work is ambiguous.
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we assume that preferences are (directly) independent of the compensation system. This implies
that rational workers will always select that compensation system that maximizes income for a
given (h, A) combination. We therefore proceed in two steps: First we determine the efficient budget
constraint, the upper envelope of X attainable from each value of (h, A). Assuming for simplicity
zero non-labour income, we have
X(h, A; w, p, α) = max
D∈{0,1}
(1− D)pA + D(wh + αpA), (9)
where D is a dummy variable equal to zero when the worker participates in the FSS system and
equal to one when he participates in the MR system. Second, the worker solves his (transformed)
program by choosing the (X, h, A) combination that maximizes his utility along the efficient budget
constraint (9). The choice of a compensation system is then given by
D(h★, A★; w, p, α) = arg max
D∈{0,1}
(1− D)pA★ + D(wh★ + αpA★) (10)
evaluated at the optimal levels of A★, h★.14
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which considers the tradeoff between services and consumption
(income), conditional on h★,FFS, optimal hours under the fee-for-service system.15 The budget line
FFS has slope p, the marginal monetary return to completing services under FFS; it passes through
the origin because hours are not remunerated under FFS. The values of A, X chosen under FFS
correspond to the optimal values A★,FFS and X★,FFS. The line MR illustrates the tradeoff between
services and income under MR, holding hours fixed at h★,FFS. It cuts the y-axis at wh★,FFS and has
slope equal to αp, reflecting the reduced fee-for-service payments received under MR.16
The efficient budget constraint associated with the transformed program is given by the bold
line.17 It is piece-wise linear and non convex; this raises well-known problems for optimization and
14The empirical model that we estimate will be adjusted to account for the institutional details of specialist physician
pay in Quebec, including income ceilings and regional payment differentials. This renders the efficient budget constraint
more complex, with more segments (which helps identification of the model), yet its derivation follows the same basic
steps.
15Notice that optimal hours under FFS are not in general equal to zero, even though w = 0. This is due to the fact
that the marginal return to hours includes both wage and the marginal effect of hours on FFS income (= w + pe). The
first-order condition for hours is given by −UhUX = w + pe.
16Under a fixed-wage system (α = 0) the monetary return to services provided is zero. A strict interpretation of
the model under these circumstances would imply zero services. However, relatively straightforward extensions to the
model would allow for positive services being allowed at the optimum. One possibility is to assume that Ue > 0 for
e < e¯, due for instance to concern of the physician for his patients. Another, is to assume that monitoring allows for a
minimum level of effort to be enforced; see, for example, Lin (2003). We do not elaborate on these possibilities here in
order to keep our model simple and since the fixed wage contract is not observed in our empirical data. In any case, our
econometric model does not impose Ue < 0.
17To be exact, this is the efficient budget constraint conditional on h★,FFS, the unconditional efficient budget constraint
varies with h as well as A.
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Figure 1: Optimal choices along the efficient budget constraint
Services (A)
Income (X) FFS
RM
A_o
A_1
B_o
labour supply estimation (Hausman, 1985; MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990). Our approach will
be to discretize the choice set of workers (physicians), considering only a finite set of values for h, A
(van Soest, 1995).
Figure 1 also illustrates potential problems of self-selection. Workers who have a preference
for low effort (or high service quality) levels (such as worker A) will tend to choose MR, while
those who have a preference for high effort levels (such as worker B) will tend to choose FFS.18 A
comparison of behaviour across compensation systems will potentially confound the effects of the
compensation system with the differences in preferences. The econometric model must therefore
allow for both observable and unobservable heterogeneity to take into account of possible selection
bias.
18Again, the figure loses some exactness by collapsing a 3-dimensional problem into two dimensions. While an indi-
vidual who chooses Ao under FFS and prefers A1 will definitely switch to MR (since utility under MR must be at least as
high as A1), the converse is not necessarily true; an individual who prefers Bo may still switch to MR at h★,MR.
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3 Institutions: Physician remuneration in Quebec
Health care is under Provincial jurisdiction in Canada. Each province determines physician com-
pensation systems and their level of pay. Within the Province of Que´bec, physicians have tradition-
ally been paid according to a fee-for-service compensation system.19 Under this system, physicians
receive a fee for each service provided. The fees paid are service specific, accounting for the dif-
ficulty and time intensiveness of the service provided. Our empirical work will account for these
differences by constructing index numbers of services and prices.20 In the present section, for expo-
sitional purposes, we take as given that there is one type of service, denoted A, and one fee, denoted
p. The physician’s budget constraint is then given by
XˆFFS = pA. (11)
In 1999, the government introduced a Mixed Remuneration (MR) scheme. Under this system,
specialist physicians receive a wage (or per diem) for time spent at work. (Half) per diems are paid
for periods of 3.5 hours of work. To receive the per diem, a physician must explicitly declare the time
period under which he is working under MR (”on the per diem”). During this period the physician
is allowed to perform certain activities within a hospital (or other recognized health-care estab-
lishments). These activities include seeing patients, administrative services, and teaching; research
activities are not covered. In practice, per-diems of 풟 = $300 are claimed in d = 3.5 hour blocks,
up to 28 over a two-week period. The per-diem was increased to $335 in 2003. Services provided
during this period fall into two categories: billable services, denoted ABS, are remunerated at a re-
duced fee-for-service, αp, 0 < α < 1; and non-billable services, denoted ANBS, are not remunerated:
α = 0.21 As with p, the discount factor α is specialty and service specific.
Billable services must be further differentiated by whether or not they were performed while
the physician was on the per diem. This is due to the fact that physicians working under MR do
not necessarily spend all of their time under the per diem. Clinical services provided outside a per
diem period are remunerated according to the same rate as for FFS physicians, p. We denote billable
services that were performed outside of the per diem by ABSFFS. Those performed under the per diem
are denoted ABSMR. Non-billable services, performed under per diem periods are not paid and hence
not recorded.
To calculate annual income under MR, let 풩 denote the average number of per diems claimed
per week throughout the year, and풲 , the number of weeks worked during the year. Gross income
19We ignore the cases of salaried physicians and physicians paid by vacation, which represents a small part (about 8%)
of physicians before 1999 and a still smaller part afterwards.
20The construction of the index numbers for all prices and services is outlined in the next section and described in
detail in the Appendix, Section A.1.
21The MR system is not applicable to work performed in private clinics; services provided in such clinics are generally
billed on a FFS basis.
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Table 1: Remuneration of Quebec Physicians included in the sample
FFS MR
No fixed remuneration - Earned for each 3.5 hours of work in hospital
Administrative/teaching activities Per diem: - All kinds of practice eligible
uncompensated - Limited to 28 every two weeks of work
Billable - Compensated at price αp during per diem hours
Clinical Services Services : - Compensated at price p outside per diem hours
compensated
at price p Non-billable - Uncompensated during per diem hours
Services : - Compensated at price p outside per diem hours
Differentiated remuneration based upon individual characteristics
Ceilinga
aExcept for emergency activities until 2001, and the whole hospital activities since 2001.
Note. The first two rows describe the way hours of work (first raw) and services (second raw) are remunerated under Fee-for-Service
(left-hand side) and Mixed Remuneration (right-hand side). The last two raws describe some income policies that equally applies to both
compensation schemes.
under the MR system is then given by
XˆMR =풲 풩 풟 + αp ABSMR + p (ABSFFS + ANBSFFS ). (12)
3.1 Net Income
The government also imposes income ceilings on physicians, beyond which the fee-for-service is
reduced by 75%. As well, there is a regionally differentiated remuneration rate, designed to induce
physicians to practice in remote areas of the province. The regional rate depends on the geographic
location of the practice, as well as the physician’s specialty. Income ceilings apply to the gross
differentiated income.
To calculate net income, define τ as the differentiated remuneration rate faced by the physician
in the region where he practices (τ > 1 denotes a favoured region). Let C denote the ceiling cap
above which services are discounted at a 0.75 rate.22 The potential income in the absence of any
ceiling cap can thus be written as
Xˆ = DXˆMR + (1− D)XˆFFS. (13)
Moreover, the net income, X, is given by:
X = min[Xˆ, C] + max
[
0.25 [Xˆ− C], 0
]
+ τXˆ. (14)
22We only observe whether the physician participated in the MR compensation system during a given year. We do not
observe the exact partition of time between FFS and MR compensation system during that year.
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Table 1 provides a summary description of the compensation system that applies to specialist
physicians in Quebec.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our data contains information on the labour supply behaviour and individual characteristics of
physicians practicing in Quebec between 1996 and 2002. These data come from two sources. The
first source of data is the time-survey conducted annually by the College of Physicians of Quebec.
This survey provides information on the average number of hours per week spent seeing patients23
as well as hours spent performing teaching and administrative duties. The survey also includes the
number of weeks worked per year for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2002. Due to the exclusion
of weeks worked from the survey in 1999-2001, we exclude these observations from the empirical
analysis. Since the MR reform occurred in the last quarter of 1999, we end up eliminating the 3
years immediately following the reform. The survey also includes information on the personal
characteristics of each physician, including: age, gender, specialization and location.
The second source of data is the Health Insurance Organization of Quebec (the RAMQ). This
is a public-sector organization, responsible for paying physicians in the province. It therefore has
administrative records containing information on the income and billing practices of each physician
working in the province. Data on income and the number of services provided are available on a
quarterly basis for every physician working in the province. We matched data from these two
sources on the basis of physician billing numbers.
Typically, each physician provides a variety of different services, each remunerated at different
rates. These rates reflect differing input requirements in terms of the physician’s time and effort.
To keep our estimation problem tractable, we aggregated these different services to form a quan-
tity index of services provided, distinguishing only between billable and non-billable services. We
weighted the different types of services by the fee received for that service. This provides a control
for the difficulty in providing the service.24 Price variation is excluded from the index by holding
price weights constant at the base year levels.25 These weights are the base-year prices paid to FFS
physicians; they are the same for both billable and non-billable services26 The price data for differ-
23Patients can be seen either in hospitals or in private clinics. Physicians working private clinics are paid the public-
sector fee schedule; they work under FFS when they see patients in private clinics.
24For example, consider the case of a pediatrician who, in a morning, completes 4 primary visits and 6 follow-up visits
at the hospital. This would count for 10 services if all services were treated equally. Yet, primary visits require an initial
interview and a complete diagnosis and generally last for 45 minutes. Control visits, on the other hand, typically last
only 20 minutes. Indeed, primary visits are compensated at 47 $ each, while the price falls to 16.50 $ for control visits.
25To account for new services and services that become obsolete, we used two base years, producing a Linked
Laspeyres index.
26This ensures that the difficulty weight applied to each service is independent of the manner in which the physician
is paid.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on sampled physicians
FFS physicians MR physicians
Before MR Reform After MR Reform Before MR Reform After MR Reform
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
Error Error Error Error
Observed practice
Weekly Total Hours 43.09 13.01 41.69 12.71 48.64 12.67 46.52 10.03
clinical 38.69 12.79 38.79 11.33 41.38 13.73 37.96 12.26
non clinical 4.40 8.36 2.90 7.22 7.26 9.62 8.55 11.22
Weeks 46.03 5.37 47.07 2.24 46.29 5.35 46.78 1.93
Total Servicesa,b 167.00 66.83 169.80 73.42 141.81 56.16 115.01 75.42
Non-billablea 71.85 47.02 73.39 55.63 60.94 36.20 52.00 47.65
Billable 95.15 55.47 96.40 56.64 80.88 49.21 63.01 46.31
Effort
(
= TotalServicesClinical Hours o f Work
)
106.82 109.81 96.68 42.21 81.70 40.00 64.93 38.73
Annual incomea 167.84 67.35 195.08 79.02 146.41 56.86 190.28 62.57
Sample characteristics
Number of physicians 139 – 105 – 111 – 92 –
Number of observations 355 – 105 – 267 – 92 –
Sex (Male=1) 0.66 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50
Age 49.89 11.17 53.57 10.70 43.07 10.04 48.30 10.11
aIn Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
bLower bound for MR physicians after the reform. See below, Section 5.3.
Note. The upper part provides the average practice behavior of Quebec pediatricians included in our sample, split according to their
choice of compensation scheme – FFS physicians are those who never adopt MR during the observation period, MR physicians are those
who switch to MR – and the time period – before (1996-1998) and after (2002) the reform. The bottom part of the Table summarizes
individual characteristics.
ent services was also aggregated into indexes for billable and non-billable services, under both FFS
and MR. The price index for services provided under FFS, denoted p, was calculated as a Laspeyres
price index. The average number of each type of service provided in the base year served as the
weight for the price of that service. The index for services provided under MR, denoted αp, was
similarly calculated by aggregating the fees paid for individual services under MR. Here we also
used the average quantities of each service provided among FFS in the base year as weights. In this
way, the MR price index excludes quantity variations due to MR switching. The precise calculations
underlying all indexes are given in the Appendix A.1.
The empirical model that we estimate is numerically intensive, involving multi-dimensional
integrals. In order to limit computational time we restricted the sample to one speciality: pediatrics.
This specialty provides high variability in the participation in MR (44% of pediatricians opted for
MR in the year 2000) and in the marginal incentives to perform services (the average discount factor,
α is equal to 30%).27 Focusing on one speciality also reduces the problem of heterogeneity in the
27Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) provides an extensive summary of MR across specialties.
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nature of services provided. Summary statistics for the sample period are provided in Table 2.
We divide the sample into Before MR Reform (1996 to 1998) and After MR Reform (2002) and on
the basis of physicians who remain under FFS or switch to MR. A physician is considered to have
switched to MR if he is paid (at least in part) under the MR system during the sample period.
The top part of the table provide information on professional practice of physicians in our sam-
ple, as disaggregated into the four categories considered. We focus on weekly hours of work, both in
clinical medicine (providing services to patients) and other activities (administration and teaching),
annual weeks of work, clinical services provided (both billable and non-billable) in thousands of
(1996) Can. Dollars, effort (total clinical services per clinical worked hour), and annual income. We
present the average and standard deviation of each variable. The bottom part of the table presents
summary statistics on demographic characteristics of each of the categories.
To summarize, while the practice patterns of MR and FFS physicians in terms of weeks of work
are very similar, there is some difference in terms of clinical and non clinical weekly hours of work.
Before the reform, MR physicians provided 7% more clinical hours and 65% more non clinical hours
of work than FFS physicians. This latter result suggests the presence of a potential selection bias
problem related to the decision to switch to MR, the non clinical hours being compensated under
MR but not under FFS. There is a substantial difference in terms of clinical services provided; MR
physicians provided 15% fewer total services before the reform. This also highlights the presence of
a potentially important selection problem in the analysis of the impact of the MR system on practice
behaviour; physicians who eventually switched to MR were, on average, low “productivity” physi-
cians. The difference in services leads to a substantial difference in annual income, pre-reform; MR
physicians earned approximately 13% less income. Results show that while before reform, 66% of
FFS physicians were male, only 52% of MR physicians were male. This indicates that the proportion
of females who switched to MR (= 59%) is larger than that of males (=38.6%). This is perhaps unsur-
prising since the female physicians work fewer hours and provide fewer services than do the male
physicians in our sample. Thus female physicians had more incentive to adhere to the MR system.
Also, MR physicians are younger (43 years on average) than physicians who remained under FFS
(50 years on average). This may partly be explained by the presence of preference habits that are
likely to be stronger for older physicians.
5 Empirical Model
We now turn to developing our empirical model, adapting the theoretical model outlined in section
2 to the institutional details of the Que´bec reform. We work with annual data and hence, specify
preferences as a function of annual consumption, leisure and services, consistent with (5). We allow
for two types of services: billable, denoted ABS, and non-billable, denoted ANBS. Recall that billable
services are remunerated under both FFS and MR while non-billable services are remunerated only
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under FFS. Non-billable services will be supplied under MR if, for example, physicians gain utility
from patient health (Arrow, 1963; Evans, 1974), or if such services are complements (or an input) in
the production of billable services.28 We allow for this possibility in estimating the model, treating
the level of non-billable services observed under MR as a lower bound to the actual level supplied.
To account for the supply of time to administrative and teaching services under FFS, when they
are not remunerated, we assume that they yield non-pecuniary benefits. For example, performing
teaching tasks may increase influence and prestige.29 To capture this in a simple and direct manner,
we allow for two types of work in our model: clinical work, denoted by hc, and non-clinical work,
denoted by ho, capturing time per week spent in administrative and teaching duties. We denote the
weekly total hours by ht (with ht = hc + ho). Pure leisure is denoted by l.
Physicians’ preferences are represented by an annual utility function,
U = U(X, ho, L, l, ABS, ANBS) (15)
defined over:
X (Annual income),
ho (Weekly hours of administrative work and teaching)
L (Weeks of leisure during the year),
l (Weekly hours of leisure outside of work),
ABS (Number of billable services supplied throughout the year),
ANBS (Number of non-billable services supplied throughout the year).
The usual time constraints imply that:
L = 52−풲
l = T − hc − ho,
where T = 24 × 7 = 168, the maximum amount of time available in a week. We allow leisure
during workweeks, l, and leisure during non-work weeks, L, to be imperfect substitutes.30 We also
allow for differences in the marginal utility (or disutility) of billable and non-billable services.31 The
efficient budget constraint is obtained from the compensation system that maximizes net income,
X, for each for each practice vector, (ho, L, l, ABS, ANBS); this is given by equations (11) to (14).32
28Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) provide the theoretical analysis of a model of physician behavior in which
utility depends on practice through the health produced, as the result of ethical concerns.
29An alternative would be to assume that these activities are complementary to billable services.
30Imperfect substitution between these two types of leisure is supported by empirical evidence (Hanoch, 1980; Blank,
1988).
31This allows for the possibility that different types of services may be associated with different levels of difficulty and
require different effort levels to complete the task. For example, an important element of non-billable services consists of
follow-up visits by the physician, which check the progress of a patient after a particular treatment.
32To compute the efficient budget constraint, one must also make assumptions about how a MR physician allocates his
15
Table 3: Sample distribution regarding discretized practice variables
Weekly Total Hours (ht) Weeks (풲) Total Services (A)
clinical (hc) non clinical (ho) Non-billable (ANBS) Billable (ABS)
5 6.23% 0 45.30% 30 3.42% 0 9.77% 0 6.84%
30 33.94% 4 40.29% 50 96.58% 30000 27.11% 20000 12.82%
45 52.01% 20 10.62% . .% 60000 27.35% 50000 23.20%
70 7.81% 40 3.79% . .% 90000 26.74% 100000 42.86%
. .% . .% . .% 180000 9.04% 190000 14.29%
Note. For each practice variable considered in the analysis, the left-hand side column provides the discretized levels used
in the estimation, the right-hand side column reports the distribution of the sample across this set.
5.1 Discrete Alternatives
Given the non linearities in the efficient budget constraint after the MR reform, we follow recent
tradition in the empirical labour supply literature (van Soest, 1995; Saether, 2005) and discretize the
physicians’ choice set.
For each variable describing the practice patterns of physicians, we consider a finite number
of possible alternatives among which each physician can choose. We allow for Nc levels of clini-
cal hours of work, No levels of non-clinical hours of work, Nw levels of weeks of work, NBS levels
of billable services and NNBS levels of non-billable services. Thus the complete choice set of prac-
tice variables involves dim(J) = Nc × No × Nw × NNBS × NBS alternatives. A single alternative,
corresponding to one particular practice possibility, is a set of values: j =
{
cj, oj, wj, NBSj, BSj
}
re-
spectively pointing to the cjth level of discretized clinical hours of work, cj ∈ {1, ..., Nc}, the ojth level
of discretized non-clinical hours of work, etc. The consumption under each alternative is computed
through the efficient budget constraint, along which the physician maximizes utility.
An important step in implementing the empirical specification is the determination of the par-
tition of the choice variables, defining each alternative. The identification of preference parame-
ters which replicate the data suggests that this partition should replicate the actual distribution of
choices observed in the data. Yet this has to be traded off with computational costs; each addi-
tional point along any given demand function induces an exponential increase in the dimension of
the choice set. These concerns led us to an asymmetric partition of the choice variables. Variables
which display greater heterogeneity in actual choices are more finely partitioned than those with
lesser heterogeneity. The sample distribution around the chosen partition is given in Table 3; it gives
dim(J) = 800 alternatives.
hours of work and billable services in and outside of the per diem periods. These issues and other details concerning the
calculation of physicians’ income are discussed in section 5.3.2
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5.2 Choice Probabilities and the Utility Function
Let Vij stand for the annual utility of physician i in alternative j. A standard assumption (McFadden,
1974) is to account for alternative-specific measurement errors on utility by decomposing Vij into a
deterministic component, uj, and a random term which is independent across alternatives eij. Thus,
Vij = uj + eij, where eij ∼ i.i.d. Gumbel (extreme value type I).
Note that the random part of utility cannot be interpreted as reflecting unobservable heterogeneity
since it is independent across alternatives; individual heterogeneity will be added in Section 5.3.1
below.
Following Keane and Moffitt (1998), we specify utility as a quadratic function, which consti-
tutes a second order approximation of any well-behaved utility function. We differentiate between
practice characteristics that are fully observable, denoted
Zj =
[
(hoj ), (52−풲j), (T − hoj − hco), (ABSj ), (Xj)
]′
,
and those for which we observe a lower bound to the actual number performed, ANBSj .
33
To begin, we consider the case for which ANBS is fully observable. The deterministic component
of utility is given by34
uj = γ′Zj + Z′jβZj + γNBS A
NBS
j + B
′
NBSZj A
NBS
j + βNBS(A
NBS
j )
2, (16)
where
β =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
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βNBSl
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⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
A physician chooses alternative j if: Vij ≥ Vik, ∀k ∕= j. The individual contribution to the
likelihood function is the probability of this event occurring, i.e.,
ℒij = P
[
Vij ≥ Vik, ∀k ∕= j
]
= P
[
eij ≥ uk − uj + eik, ∀k ∕= j
]
=
euj
J
∑
k=1
euk
. (17)
33Recall that MR physicians do not spend all of their time on the per diem. When they perform non-billable services off
the per diem, they are paid for them as a FFS physician would be and we observe the transactions. When they perform
non-billable services on the per diem they are not paid for them and we do not observe the transactions. The number
of non-billable services that are observed for MR physicians is therefore a lower bound to the number of such services
actually performed.
34In what follows, the individual index i is neglected, where possible, for clarity.
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5.3 Estimation issues
Several features of our data set necessitate slight modifications to the estimation methodology and
likelihood function. First, since every combination of the discretized practice variables has to be
considered as an alternative, the model allows for choices that contradict the technical constraint a
physician faces. For example, a physician could theoretically choose to provide the highest available
level of services whereas exerting zero hours of clinical work. Obviously such an alternative is not
observed in our sample. For estimation purposes, we exclude those alternatives that are impossible
in practice and, in concrete terms, never observed. We then estimate the model by reducing the
choice set to the alternatives actually chosen in the sample: JC ⊂ J, where dim(JC) = 640. Note
that this strategy leads us to use the same alternatives for estimation independent of the alternative
that was chosen. This uniform conditioning property (McFadden, 1978) has been shown to ensure
consistent estimation.
To account for the partial observability of non-billable services under MR, we integrate over all
possible actual services that could have generated a given level of observed services. Let ANBSm de-
note the level of non-billable services that is observed for a given physician (i.e., delivered outside
the per diem period). Since, for this observation, ANBSm is a lower bound to the actual number of non-
billable services provided, we observe ANBSm whenever ANBS ∈
{
ANBSm , ANBSm+1, A
NBS
m+2, . . . , A
NBS
NNBS
}
.
What is more, since the different levels of non-billable services are mutually exclusive, the individ-
ual contribution to likelihood for an MR physician that chose the observable Zj, ANBSm is obtained
by summing over ANBSj j ≥ m; i.e.,35
P
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
=
exp(γ′Zj + Z′jβZj)
JC
∑
k=1
euk
NNBS
∑
l=m
exp(γNBS ANBSl + B
′
A.Zj A
NBS
l + βNBS(A
NBS
l )
2). (18)
The traditional logit probabilities are thus corrected for the uncertainty about the chosen alter-
native inside the chosen subset. The contribution to the likelihood of individual i is then given by
ℒij =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ eujJC
∑
k=1
euk
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
1−Di (
P
(
Zj, ANBSm
))Di
, (19)
35
P
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
= P
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
∪ P
(
Zj, ANBSm+1
)
∪ . . . ∪ P
(
Zj, ANBSNNBS
)
=
NNBS
∑
l=m
exp[u(Zj, ANBSl )]/
JC
∑
k=1
euk ,
and hence
P
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
=
NNBS
∑
l=m
exp
(
γ′Zj + Z′jβZj + γNBS A
NBS
j + B
′
NBS Zj A
NBS
j + βNBS(A
NBS
j )
2
)
/
JC
∑
k=1
euk ,
the manipulation of which gives the result.
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where Di indicates whether a physician worked under MR (Di = 1) or FFS (Di = 0).
5.3.1 Heterogeneity in Preferences
We account for observable heterogeneity in the model, allowing the estimated coefficients to be
functions of individual characteristics. In particular, we allow the linear coefficient terms, γ, and
the quadratic coefficient terms, β, to be linear functions of age and gender; we write
γki = γ
k
0 + γ
k
1 × Agei + γk2 × DMalei k = {o, l, L, BS, NBS, X} ,
βki = β
k
0 + β
k
1 × Agei + βk2 × DMalei k = {o, l, L, BS, NBS, X} ,
(20)
where DMale is a dummy variable indicating male physicians.
We account for unobservable heterogeneity by adding normally distributed random terms to
the functions in (20) (with the exception of γNBSi ).
36 Define
γ˜i = (γ˜
o
i , γ˜
L
i , γ˜
l
i , γ˜
BS
i , γ˜
X
i )
to be the vector of random coefficients, where
γ˜k
′
i = γ
k′
0 + γ
k′
1 × Agei + γk
′
2 × DMalei + ηk
′
i k
′ = o, l, L, BS, X.
We assume that ηk
′
i ∼ N(0, σk′) and that the ηs are mutually independent, and independent of
ej, ∀j. Conditional on the γ˜i,s the contributions to the likelihood are given by
lij(γ˜i, βi) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝ euijJC
∑
k=1
euik
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
1−Di (
Pij
(
Zj, ANBSm
))Di
, (21)
where the utility index now depends on i to incorporate both observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity. The unconditional probabilities correspond to the mixed logit specification:
ℒij =
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
lij(γ˜i, βi)φ(ηo)φ(ηL)φ(ηl)φ(ηBS)φ(ηX)dηodηLdηldηBSdηX, (22)
where φ denotes the normal density function.
The estimation of this model requires the computation of a large number of five-dimensional
integrals. To calculate these integrals we rely on simulation methods, approximating (22) by the
average value of lij(γ˜i, βi) over r random draws in the distribution of each ηk.37 The simulated
Maximum Likelihood estimator derived from this specification is asymptotically equivalent to an
exact ML estimator given that
√
r rises faster than the size of the sample (Gourieroux and Monfort,
1993).
36The model did not converge when unobserved heterogeneity was added to γNBSi , possibly do to the fact that we only
observe a lower bound to the number of non-billable services.
37The draws were generated using Halton sequences that produces lower simulation variance for given r (Train, 1999).
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5.3.2 Calculating income
We identify the utility-function parameters by restricting the observed decisions to be optimal
choices. This requires calculating the utility associated with each alternative available to a physi-
cian; i.e., each j ∈ J. Since each physician is only observed in one state in a given period, and since
different states imply different income levels, estimation requires calculating the counter-factual in-
come levels for each of the unobserved states. To do so, we rely on our discussion of the budget
constraint presented in Section 3. In particular we use equations (11) to (14) to predict the income
for each alternative.
Recall from our discussion in Section 3, we aggregated services provided into two types: billable,
denoted ABS, and non-billable, denoted ANBS. Under FFS, both types of services are paid at the
same aggregate price, denoted pt. Consumption in alternative j, in year t, under FFS is then given
by
XFFSj,t = pt(A
BS
j + A
NBS
j ). (23)
Calculating consumption under MR is somewhat more complex, since payment for services
depends on whether the service is provided under the per diem or not. Recall that billable services
provided under the per diem were paid a lower fee αp. A number of issues arise in calculating (12).
First, a physician’s income depends on the number of per diems claimed. As this is unknown, we
must approximate it. To do so, we assume that each MR physician works the maximum number of
per diems possible for a given number of hours worked, the remainder of his time is then allocated
to FFS. We estimate the number of per diems worked during a week by
풩ˆ =
min
{
f loor
(
2×(hc+ho)
d
)
, 28
}
2
, (24)
where d is the number of hours per per diem and 28 represents the maximum number of per diems that
a physician can claim over a two-week period. Second, recall that we distinguish between billable
services provided under the per diem, denoted ABSFFS, for which the physician is paid a discounted
fee, αp, and those provided outside of the per diem, denoted ABSMR, for which the physician is paid
the regular fee, p. Given that we do not observe whether or not a given service was remunerated
under the per diem, we use θABS and (1− θ)ABS to estimate ABSMR and ABSFFS, respectively. Here θ is
the proportion of time spent under the per diem, estimated as the share of total hours worked in a
week under the per diem and given by
θˆ =
d 풩ˆ
hc + ho
. (25)
For each random parameter, we perform 20 Halton draws specific to each individual. For a given draw, the likelihood is
evaluated by computing the utility derived from each of the JC alternatives. We then calculate the simulated probability
of selecting each alternative, conditional on the draw. The likelihood of selecting each alternative is then the average of
these simulated probabilities. Each iteration of the likelihood requires computing utility N× JC × 20 times. We estimated
the model using parallel programming on a cluster of 20 processors.
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Hence we attribute billable services to MR and FFS in the same proportion as we attribute hours
worked to MR and FFS.
Consumption in alternative j, in year t, under MR is then given by38
XMRj,t =풲j풩ˆj풟t + pt ANBSj + θˆjαpt(ABSj ) + (1− θˆj)pt ABSj , (26)
where풲j is the number of weeks worked in alternative j, 풩ˆj is the number of half per diems worked
in alternative j, 풟t is the payment per half per diem in year t, and θˆj is the estimated share of total
hours worked in a week in alternative j attributed to the per diem.
We accounted for government imposed income ceilings and regional income differentials as per
(14). The actual provisions governing regional remuneration rate calculations involve a wide vari-
ety of individual characteristics – such as city of practice – not included in the data set. However,
our data contains each physician’s quarterly income before and after the correction for the region-
ally differentiated remuneration rate. We therefore approximate the actual regionally-differentiated
remuneration rate facing physician i, and denoted τi, as the ratio of the two reported levels of in-
come over the whole sample period.
The actual level of income ceilings during the period is publicly available from government au-
thorities in charge of physician compensation. However, these ceilings depend on the establishment
in which the services were provided, information that is not available to us.39 To take account of
these exceptions in a tractable manner we calculate the average percentage of time that pediatricians
spent in establishments where income ceilings were applied. The relevant ceiling for physician i,
is then taken to be the actual income ceiling adjusted for the average percentage of time spent in
establishments where the cap applies.
With these elements in hand, the actual consumption in each alternative is predicted according
to equations (23) and (26).40 To convert consumption into real terms we deflate actual (nominal)
consumption in each alternative using the price index provided by Statistics Canada. The average
inflation rate for the whole period is 1.92%. Overall, our strategy for approximating consumption
in each alternative proved to be a precise predictor of the observed income of physicians included
in our sample.41
38Note that the fact that we only observe a lower bound to ANBS does not affect our calculations of income. This is
because the observed lower bound represents the exact number of non-billable acts performed outside of the per diem
period where they were remunerated. The unobservable part of ANBS is provided within the per diem period and does
not affect income.
39For example, emergency services were excluded from the capped income prior to 2001.
40For simplicity, we ignore income taxes in our analysis. However, since most physicians in our sample period have a
yearly income implying the highest marginal (provincial + federal) tax rate and since there has been no tax reform over
our period, the marginal tax rate is likely to be constant for most physicians.
41A regression of physicians’ observed income on their predicted income yielded a R2 of 0.83, with a coefficient of 0.97
(standard error = 0.005) and a non significant intercept.
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5.3.3 Constrained Choice
Recall that the actual choice of a compensation system was not individual specific. Rather, members
of specialist departments within each hospital determined the compensation system by vote, only
adopting the MR system if the vote was unanimously in favour. This raises the possibility that some
physicians may be constrained in their choice of a compensation system and, hence, not be located
on the efficient budget constraint.42 However only those physicians who prefer MR are potentially
constrained; those who prefer FFS are ensured their unconstrained choice since the voting rule
is unanimous. This implies that physicians who are observed on sections of the efficient budget
constraint under MR are not constrained. Physicians, observed under FFS can be divided into two
groups: Those who are observed in an alternative j for which XMRj > X
FFS
j are constrained. Those
who select alternatives for which XMRj < X
FFS
j are potentially constrained.
To account for constraints on choice we let ψ denote the probability that a physician is con-
strained from attaining the efficient budget constraint. We then define the following observed
regimes:
ℛ1 the physician is observed FFS when only FFS is available (i.e., pre-reform observations);
ℛ2 the physician is observed MR when MR dominates;
ℛ3 the physician is observed FFS when MR dominates;
ℛ4 the physician is observed FFS when FFS dominates.
We disregard the case of physicians observed MR while FFS dominates which is ruled out by as-
sumption.43
Let Dij indicate the presence of physician i in regime ℛj, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A constrained physi-
cian selects his optimal labour supply alternative along the FFS budget constraint rather than the
efficient budget constraint denoted E f f . We therefore redefine utility to account for the relevant
budget constraint. Let uℬij denote the utility derived by physician i from alternative j when income
is computed under budget constraint ℬ ∈ {FFS, E f f } and let
Pℬ
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
(27)
denote the probability of observing a given alternative
(
Zj, ANBSm
)
for an MR physician, from (18).
42We do see a number of physicians (30 in 2002) who are paid FFS contracts when they would earn higher income
under MR, for the same practice variables.
43There are only 10 observations that fall into this category; they are classified in ℛ2. One interpretation of this case is
that these physicians make optimization errors.
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The individual contribution to the likelihood function is given by
li(γ˜i, βi) =
[
eu
FFS
ij
∑k∈J eu
FFS
ik
]Di1
×
[
(1− ψ) PEFF
(
Zj, ANBSm
)]Di2
×
[
ψ
eu
FFS
ij
∑k∈J eu
FFS
ik
]Di3
×
⎡⎣ψ euFFSij
∑k∈J eu
FFS
ik
+ (1− ψ) e
uE f fij
∑k∈J eu
E f f
ik
⎤⎦(1−D1i−D2i−D3i) .
(28)
The likelihood function reflects the fact that the constraints on behaviour only apply to regimes
ℛ2 – ℛ4 since ℛ1 occurs before the reform. Physicians in regime ℛ2 are unconstrained which
occurs with probability (1− ψ). The physicians in regime ℛ3 are constrained which occurs with
probability ψ. The physicians in regimeℛ4 can be either constrained or unconstrained.
6 Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates
We estimated three versions of the quadratic utility function (16): first, in the absence of heterogene-
ity; second, with observed heterogeneity; and third, with observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
Each case incorporates constrained choice of the compensation system – the contribution to the like-
lihood of observation i, conditional on γo, is given by (28).44 The results are presented in Table 4.
The first column presents results without heterogeneity. The second column presents results when
observed heterogeneity is introduced into the linear and quadratic terms for non-clinical hours
worked (ho), weeks of leisure (L), hours of leisure per day (l), non-billable services (NBS), billable
services (BS) and income (X). These coefficients are permitted to vary with age and gender. Fi-
nally, the third column introduces unobserved heterogeneity. In this specification a random term is
added to the parameters on the linear terms (in addition to being functions of age and gender). The
standard error of this error term is reported accordingly.
44We also estimated the model without taking account of constrained choice. The results for these specifications were
generally less satisfactory than those presented.
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Table 4: Mixed Logit Parameters: Quadratic Utility
Multinomial Logit Observed heterogeneity Full specification
Parameter (Stud.) Parameter (Stud.) Parameter (Stud.)
γo 2.7e-01∗∗∗ ( 3.58) 5.2e-01∗∗∗ ( 5.48) 5.3e-01∗∗∗ ( 5.11)
σo – – – – 5.7e-02∗ ( 1.66)
γo ×Male – – 1.8e-01∗∗∗ ( 4.55) 1.5e-01∗∗∗ ( 3.12)
γo × Age – – -6.7e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.49) -6.9e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.29)
γL 4.5e-09 ( 0.00) 2.1e-14 ( 0.00) 1.8e-08 ( 0.39)
γL ×Male – – 4.5e-14 ( 0.00) -7.5e-09 ( 0.17)
γL × Age – – 4.6e-14 ( 0.00) -3.6e-10 ( 0.01)
γl 4.8e-01∗∗∗ ( 6.30) 2.2e-01 ( 1.16) 2.7e-01∗ ( 1.31)
σl – – – – 2.1e-02∗ ( 1.51)
γl ×Male . – -9.7e-02 ( 0.83) -8.9e-02 ( 0.81)
γl × Age – – 7.0e-03∗ ( 1.51) 7.1e-03∗ ( 1.55)
γNBS -2.9e-02 ( 1.25) -1.7e-02 ( 0.60) -8.0e-03 ( 0.25)
γNBS ×Male – – 1.3e-02∗ ( 1.43) 1.4e-02 ( 1.27)
γNBS × Age – – -4.0e-05 ( 0.10) -1.1e-04 ( 0.24)
γBS 1.1e-02 ( 0.58) 7.6e-03 ( 0.31) 8.9e-02∗∗ ( 2.04)
σBS – – – – 8.3e-02∗∗∗ ( 7.04)
γBS ×Male – – 1.9e-03 ( 0.18) -4.1e-03 ( 0.17)
γBS × Age – – 4.6e-04 ( 1.07) 5.7e-04 ( 0.75)
γx 8.4e-02∗∗∗ ( 4.10) 9.5e-02∗∗∗ ( 3.24) 9.7e-02∗∗∗ ( 2.36)
σx – – – – 3.2e-02∗∗∗ ( 6.17)
γx ×Male – – -8.1e-04 ( 0.06) -8.2e-03 ( 0.45)
γx × Age – – -4.4e-04 ( 0.87) 4.2e-04 ( 0.56)
βoL 3.1e-04 ( 0.14) 9.6e-04 ( 0.44) 9.5e-04 ( 0.45)
βol -2.2e-03
∗∗∗ ( 4.26) -2.4e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.65) -2.4e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.28)
βoNBS -1.3e-04 ( 0.70) -5.2e-05 ( 0.26) -2.4e-05 ( 0.11)
βoBS -9.2e-04
∗∗∗ ( 3.78) -8.2e-04∗∗∗ ( 3.65) -6.6e-04∗∗∗ ( 2.83)
βox 2.1e-04 ( 1.02) 9.8e-06 ( 0.04) 1.2e-05 ( 0.05)
βLl -5.8e-04 ( 0.38) -6.2e-04 ( 0.28) -4.4e-04 ( 0.35)
βLNBS -2.4e-03
∗∗∗ ( 2.62) -1.8e-03∗∗ ( 2.22) -1.9e-03∗∗ ( 2.29)
βLBS -2.6e-03
∗∗∗ ( 3.36) -2.0e-03∗∗∗ ( 2.77) -2.3e-03∗∗∗ ( 2.92)
βLx 2.2e-03∗∗∗ ( 3.36) 1.7e-03∗∗∗ ( 2.58) 1.8e-03∗∗∗ ( 2.71)
βlNBS 1.7e-04 ( 1.05) 8.5e-05 ( 0.60) 7.4e-05 ( 0.53)
βlBS -1.0e-05 ( 0.07) -1.1e-04 ( 0.82) -1.1e-04 ( 0.84)
βlx -4.0e-04∗∗∗ ( 2.61) -3.3e-04∗∗∗ ( 2.73) -3.5e-04∗∗∗ ( 2.91)
βNBSBS -3.1e-05 ( 0.37) 2.3e-05 ( 0.28) 1.6e-04
∗∗ ( 1.73)
βNBSx 1.4e-04∗ ( 1.41) 3.5e-05 ( 0.32) 2.5e-05 ( 0.20)
βBSx 2.1e-04∗∗ ( 1.86) 1.0e-04 ( 0.83) -4.3e-05 ( 0.29)
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Table 4: Mixed Logit Parameters: Quadratic Utility (Continued)
Multinomial Logit Observed heterogeneity Full specification
Parameter (Stud.) Parameter (Stud.) Parameter (Stud.)
βo -4.3e-04 ( 0.71) -7.3e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.05) -9.3e-03∗∗∗ ( 4.02)
βo ×Male – – -4.2e-03∗∗∗ ( 3.31) -3.8e-03∗∗∗ ( 2.72)
βo × Age – – 2.0e-04∗∗∗ ( 4.72) 2.1e-04∗∗∗ ( 4.51)
βL 1.1e-03 ( 0.13) 5.3e-03 ( 0.39) 4.3e-03 ( 0.52)
βL ×Male – – -1.8e-03∗∗ ( 1.81) -1.8e-03∗∗ ( 1.84)
βL × Age – – -8.6e-05∗ ( 1.63) -7.6e-05∗ ( 1.56)
βl -1.7e-03∗∗∗ ( 6.43) -7.1e-04 ( 0.91) -8.9e-04 ( 1.08)
βl ×Male – – 4.4e-04 ( 0.90) 4.0e-04 ( 0.86)
βl × Age – – -2.8e-05∗ ( 1.41) -2.8e-05∗ ( 1.47)
βNBS -7.1e-05∗ ( 1.59) -6.6e-05 ( 0.65) -2.7e-04∗∗ ( 2.20)
βNBS ×Male – – -6.2e-06 ( 0.12) -3.5e-05 ( 0.61)
βNBS × Age – – 5.4e-07 ( 0.30) 3.3e-06∗ ( 1.57)
βBS -1.8e-04∗∗∗ ( 3.41) -9.3e-05 ( 0.89) -3.3e-04 ( 1.12)
βBS ×Male – – 5.5e-05 ( 1.13) 1.4e-04 ( 0.98)
βBS × Age – – -1.9e-06 ( 1.07) -6.9e-06 ( 1.06)
βx -2.1e-04∗∗∗ ( 2.88) -1.9e-04∗∗ ( 1.91) -1.5e-04 ( 1.16)
βx ×Male – – 2.9e-06 ( 0.07) 7.2e-05 ( 1.26)
βx × Age – – 1.2e-06 ( 0.77) -2.7e-06 ( 1.10)
ψ 4.6e-01∗∗∗ ( 6.41) 4.6e-01∗∗∗ ( 6.42) 4.6e-01∗∗∗ ( 6.28)
Log-Likelihood -4057.0 -3969.9 -3562.6
Legend. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Note. ML estimation of the model on the sample of pediatricians (N=819 observations). The left-hand side provides point
estimates and standard errors of the Multinomial Logit model that includes only parameters from the quadratic function
defined over practice variables. Observable heterogeneity is added in the model displayed in the middle of the table. The
right-side includes unobserved heterogeneity through random coefficients, assumed normally distributed.
The discrete approach to estimating labour supply models requires the marginal utility of con-
sumption to be positive at all chosen points along the budget constraint van Soest (1995). This
requirement is satisfied for 86% of observations in the model with observed heterogeneity. It is
satisfied for 85% of the observations in the multinomial-logit model (with no heterogeneity) and
for 60% of the observations in the model with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In the
interests of selecting a model that best fits the data, while respecting theoretical restrictions, we con-
centrate on the version of the model with observed heterogeneity. Note, we choose this specification
in spite of the fact that the likelihood function increased substantially (from -3969 to -3562) upon the
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity. This reflects the tradeoff between fitting the sample data
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Table 5: Model Fit
Observed Predicted Observed
Total 2002 2002
Weekly Total Hours (ht) 44.62 45.45 44.18
clinical (hc) 39.37 39.41 38.86
non clinical (ho) 5.25 6.04 5.32
Weeks (풲) 49.32 49.51 50.00
Total Services(A)a 149.04 141.02 140.71
Non-billable (ANBS) 64.87 60.24 61.98
Billable (ABS) 84.16 80.77 78.73
Effort
(
e = A
NBS+ABS
hc∗풲
)
76.76 72.27 72.42
Annual incomea (X) 144.08 150.45 149.58
aThousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. The cells display the average practice behavior (in terms of practice variables) observed
over the whole sample period (first column) and in 2002 (last column). The second column reports
the average practice behavior predicted by the model in 2002.
and estimating economic models. Our selection criteria is in the spirit of a more general strategy of
selecting the best fitting model among the set of models for which the theoretical restrictions are not
rejected. This ensures that predictions are based on economic, rather than a statistical, criteria. In-
terestingly, whatever the specification considered, the probability, ψ, that a physician is constrained
from attaining the efficient budget constraint is very high (=0.46 in all specifications) and highly
significant. This suggests that introducing a reform allowing physicians to choose their compensa-
tion system individually may have a strong effect on their behaviour. We will return to this issue in
section 6.2.3.
Table 5 compares the predictions with observed choices for the year 2002 (the only post-reform
year in our sample). The middle column of the table gives the average predicted values of the differ-
ent choice variables of the model. The last column gives the average observed values of these same
variables. On the whole, the model’s fit is very good. The average (combined) hours worked per
week, average clinical hours worked, average weeks worked, average number of billable services,
average effort (time spent per clinical service), and average income are all matched very closely by
the model’s predictions. The model has more trouble matching the number of non-clinical hours
worked.45
45Caution should be exercised in interpreting the statistics over non-billable services. Since the recorded volume of
non-billable services is a lower bound to the actual volume of services completed, we calculate the observed volume as
the recorded volume divided by the (estimated) probability that the physician provides additional services.
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Table 6: Elasticity of practice variables
Bench- Income Hourly wage rate Fee per unit of service
mark εk/y εk/w ε˜k/w wh
t풲
y εk/y εk/p ε˜k/p
pA
y εk/y
Weekly Total Hours (ht) 45.04 0.004 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.088 0.039 0.049
clinical (hc) 39.37 -0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.080 0.106 -0.026
non clinical (ho) 5.67 0.041 0.143 0.052 0.092 0.142 -0.429 0.571
Weeks (풲) 49.28 -0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.023 0.041 -0.064
Total Services(A)a 138.67 -0.037 -0.082 -0.001 -0.081 -0.092 0.415 -0.507
Non-billable (ANBS) 58.85 -0.042 -0.097 -0.003 -0.094 -0.280 0.306 -0.586
Billable (ABS) 79.83 -0.032 -0.071 0.001 -0.072 0.046 0.495 -0.449
Effort
(
e = A
NBS+ABS
hc∗풲
)
71.47 -0.030 -0.077 -0.010 -0.067 -0.154 0.263 -0.418
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
6.2 Policy simulations
Estimation of a structural model allows us to simulate the impact of different compensation poli-
cies on physician labour supply behaviour. Different compensation policies imply different budget
constraints, which in turn affect the probabilities of selecting different practice alternatives. Given
knowledge of the preference parameters we simply calculate the (expected) predicted behaviour on
the basis of the revised budget constraint.
6.2.1 Elasticities through policy simulations
Table 6 provides results on elasticities of practice variables with respect to non-labour income,
hourly wage rate, and fee per service. The second column provides our benchmark; it is computed
as the average practice choice simulated from the estimated model against a simplified budget
constraint, broadly representative of the prevailing case before the reform. We assume an hourly
wage rate equal to $10, the full fee under FFS on all clinical services, and an exogenous non-labor
income equal to $10,000.46 We remove all the other parameters that may affect a physician’s bud-
get constraint (e.g., income ceilings and regionally differentiated remuneration). The physician’s
budget is thus linear in (w, p, y) with all arguments strictly positive. As the MR reform involved
important changes in fee per service unit and wage parameters, for comparison sake, we also per-
formed our elasticity simulations based on large (50%) percentage changes in each of these pa-
rameters. Similarly, the computation of the income elasticity, εk/y, for each practice variable, k, is
based on the variation in practice induced by a 50% increase in non-labour income. Also, we use
46We add small positive hourly wage and non-labour income to the observed FFS contract in order to allow us to
simulate elasticities at the benchmark.
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Slutsky decompositions of uncompensated elasticities into compensated and total income elastici-
ties: εk/w = ε˜k/w + wht풲y εk/y and εk/p = ε˜k/p +
pA
y εk/y, to compute the wage and fee per service
compensated elasticities of each practice variable.47
Results from the second panel of Table 6 indicate that, as expected, physicians’ average clinical
weekly hours of work, weeks of work, and the volume of (billable and non-billable) services are
negatively affected by an increase in non-labour income. However, non-clinical hours of work in-
crease with non-labour income. This may partly be explained by the fact that this activity yields
important non-pecuniary benefits to the physician and that these benefits are normal goods. Over-
all, the simulated elasticities are modest (in absolute value) though, ranging between -0.005 for
weeks of work and -0.037 for services. Moreover, physicians’ effort, as measured by the volume
of services provided (in 1996 Can. dollars) per clinical hour of work, decreases with non-labour
income but very slightly, with an elasticity of -0.030.
Results from the third panel indicate that uncompensated own wage elasticities of total weekly
hours and weeks of work are 0.018 and -0.006, respectively. This suggests that physicians’ labour
supply curves for weekly hours and weeks are upward sloping and backward bending respectively,
but with a modest response of these variables to a change in the wage rate. Moreover, the compen-
sated own wage elasticities are positive, although quite small, being estimated at 0.010 and 0.005
respectively. The cross compensated wage elasticity on effort is negative but also small (=-0.010),
indicating that an increase in the wage rate induces slightly a physician to provide less services per
unit of time.
The last panel provides results regarding fee per service elasticities. The own uncompensated
elasticity on services is negative and close to -0.1. Thus, the labour supply curve for services is
backward-bending. Interestingly, the negative effect of an increase in the fee per service is much
larger on non-billable services (=-0.280) than on billable services (= -0.046). The compensated own
elasticity of services is positive as expected [see eq. (6)], and quite large (= 0.415). Furthermore, a
compensated increase in the fee per service positively affects the physician’s effort, with an elas-
ticity of 0.263. These results indicate that physicians respond much more to incentives in terms of
services and work effort than in terms of hours and weeks. Notice finally that the compensated
elasticity of non-clinical hours with respect to fee per service is negative and quite high in absolute
value (=0.429). Our results indicate that a compensated increase in the fee per service induces the
physician to spend less time in teaching and administrative activities and more time to perform
clinical services.
In short, our results on elasticities suggest that physicians (pediatricians) react to incentives in
the directions predicted by the theory. However, the own compensated and uncompensated elastic-
ities of hours and weeks are very small. This result is similar to those reported in studies focusing
47This is an approximation since the choice set is discrete and the variations in wage and fee per service are not in-
finitesimal.
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Table 7: Treatment effects of MR
FFS Group Free MR Individual Free MR Mandatory MR
Practice Variation Practice Variation Practice Variation
Weekly Total Hours (ht) 43.72 45.45 3.94 % 46.68 6.77 % 46.65 6.68 %
clinical (hc) 39.09 39.41 0.82 % 39.66 1.45 % 39.67 1.48 %
non clinical (ho) 4.63 6.04 30.32 % 7.03 51.67 % 6.98 50.61 %
Weeks (풲) 49.62 49.51 -0.21 % 49.44 -0.36 % 49.46 -0.31 %
Total Services(A)a 155.43 141.02 -9.27 % 130.14 -16.27 % 131.31 -15.52 %
Non-billable (ANBS) 67.58 60.24 -10.85 % 54.64 -19.15 % 55.35 -18.09 %
Billable (ABS) 87.86 80.77 -8.06 % 75.50 -14.06 % 75.96 -13.54 %
Effort
(
e = A
NBS+ABS
hc∗풲
)
80.14 72.27 -9.82 % 66.38 -17.17 % 66.93 -16.49 %
Annual incomea (X) 137.18 150.45 9.68 % 160.90 17.29 % 159.98 16.63 %
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behavior (in terms of practice variables) predicted by the model in 2002 depending on whether physicians
are paid according to: a mandatory Fee-for-Service (first column) ; the Mixed Remuneration scheme chosen conditionally on group
agreement (second column) ; an MR system freely chosen on an individual basis (third column) ; or a mandatory MR (last column). The
percentage variation provided for each compensation scheme takes FFS as a benchmark.
on physicians who are not self-employed: for example, Sloan (1975); Noether (1986); Saether (2005)
found that the wage elasticities are modest or insignifiant in this context. On the other hand, the
(compensated) elasticity of services and effort are positive and much larger. This suggests that
physicians adjust their practice behaviour much more in terms of their volume of services and their
work effort than in terms of labour supply. Another important result is that non-clinical hours seem
to be quite sensitive to a compensated change in the fee per service.
6.2.2 The Observed Reform
We begin our analysis of different reforms by simulating the effects of the observed policy – the
introduction of the MR system as a constrained choice on the part of physicians. We compare
predicted behaviour under FFS (the first column of Table 7) to that under the MR system, taking
account of the probability of being constrained. The budget constraint under MR is then the mixture
of the constrained budget constraint and the unconstrained (efficient) budget constraint. The results
are given in the second column of Table 7, labeled ”Group Free MR”. The results are instructive in
many ways. First, notice the reform increased the number of weekly hours worked, by nearly 4 %.
Yet this is almost entirely due to increases in non-clinical hours; clinical hours increased only very
slightly, less than 1%. This suggests that the per diem incorporated into the MR payment system
did induce physicians to spend more time on administrative and teaching activities. The reform
also had important effects on the volume of services provided. Physicians reduced their supply
of services in the order of 9%. This reflects physicians responding to (large) monetary incentives.
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The MR compensation system reduced the marginal payment for services received by physicians
and hence the marginal benefit to their completion. This substitution effect is accentuated by the
negative income effect on the volume of services associated with the higher annual income received
by MR physicians. Indeed, the physician annual income increased on average by nearly 10%. This
reflects the large per diem payments that MR physicians received, independent of the number of
services provided. The fact that the reform was expensive also raises the question as to whether or
not it could have been enacted for lower cost. We return to this point below in Section 6.2.4. Our
results show that effort decreased with the reform suggests that physicians spent more time with
their patients under MR (recall effort is defined as clinical hours per service completed). This may
have implications for the quality of health care provided. Finally, the number of weeks worked is
insensitive to the mode of payment. This is consistent with empirical results obtained elsewhere;
see, for example, Sloan (1975).
6.2.3 Mandatory Reforms and Selection
Given the voluntary nature of the observed reform, a natural question to address is how a manda-
tory reform would affect behaviour. We address this within the context of our model by simulating
optimal choices along the MR budget constraint. We then compare the resulting predicted be-
haviour to that under FFS. The results are presented in the fourth column of Table 7. They suggest
that a mandatory reform would have had considerable effects on services provided (a decrease of
15.5% relative to FFS) and non-clinical hours (an increase of 50.6% relative to FFS); these are much
larger than under the observed reform. Physicians would also spend more time with patients –
services per hour worked seeing patients would decrease by 16.5% relative to FFS. The cost of the
program would also be significantly affected (an increase of 16.6% relative to FFS).
The mandatory reform changes two things vis-a`-vis the observed reform: first, it removes choice
(and hence selection) and second it removes constraints on an individual’s choice of a MR compen-
sation system. To decompose the overall effect into its component parts (and isolate the importance
of selection) we simulated the observed voluntary reform, removing the constraint on choice. We
set ψ = 0, allowing physicians to choose their compensation system individually along the efficient
budget constraint. The subsequent predicted behaviour is compared to behaviour under FFS. The
results are given in the the third column of Table 7, labelled “Individual Free MR.” They are very
close to the results from the mandatory reform. This suggests that constraints on choice are the im-
portant factor in explaining the difference between the actual and mandatory reforms. Even though
workers who switched to MR were low-productive workers, many high-productive workers – who
would have reacted strongly to the change in compensation system – would have switched to MR
if they had not been constrained in their choice. Selection (on observables) is not responsible for a
large part of the observed effect of the reform.48 Physicians who are currently observed under FFS
48Similar results were obtained when we allowed for unobservable heterogeneity, suggesting that selection on unob-
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Table 8: Practice under a cost-preserving wage under free MR
MR contract
FFS Constant cost Actual
Practice Variation Practice Variation
Weekly Total Hours 43.72 45.04 3.01% 46.68 6.77 %
clinical (hc) 39.09 38.39 -1.79% 39.66 1.45 %
non clinical (ho) 4.63 6.65 43.55% 6.98 50.61 %
Weeks (풲) 49.62 49.65 0.07% 49.44 -0.36 %
Total Services(A)a 155.43 145.37 -6.47% 130.14 -16.27 %
Non-billable (ANBS) 67.58 62.90 -6.93% 54.64 -19.15 %
Billable (ABS) 87.86 82.47 -6.13% 75.50 -14.06 %
Effort
(
e = A
NBS+ABS
hc∗풲
)
80.14 76.27 -4.83% 66.38 -17.17 %
Annual incomea (X) 137.18 137.18 0.00% 160.90 17.29 %
Per Diem (3.5 hours) – $123.55 $300.00
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behavior (in terms of practice variables) predicted by model II (accounting for ob-
served heterogeneity) in 2002 depending on whether physicians are paid according to: a mandatory Fee-for-
Service (first column) ; the Mixed Remuneration scheme chosen freely at the individual level, associated to a
per diem that maintain health care costs at a constant level. The last column provides the percentage variation
in practice induced by the change.
can (on average) find a practice pattern under MR that provides them with higher income and that
they prefer, but they are constrained from choosing it.
6.2.4 The Welfare Effects of (Constant-Cost) Contracts
One striking feature that is highlighted by the simulations in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 is the cost of the
MR contract; the large per diem paid to physicians caused incomes to increase by over 9% in all ver-
sions of the reform investigated in Table 7. It is therefore of interest to investigate whether alterna-
tive contracts could achieve similar results at lower costs. To do so we concentrate on constant-cost
contracts, contracts that keep annual payments to physicians equal to those observed pre-reform
(under FFS). We restrict attention to reforms under which physicians freely choose to adopt MR.
This allows some measure of welfare comparison across contracts since physicians are necessarily
(weakly) better off under the new contract and costs are constant. The actual realized benefits will
then depend on how physician behaviour changes under the new contract as this affects patient
welfare.
To investigate physician behaviour under constant-cost contracts we fix the fee-for-service paid
under MR at the levels observed in the actual MR contract, but allow the per-diem to be deter-
servables does not play a substantial role either.
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mined endogenously at a level that holds expected costs constant.49 The results are given in Table 8
(we replicate the results of the individual-free reform under the observed contract from Table 7 for
ease of comparison). The effects on physician behaviour would have been less pronounced under
a constant-cost contract. The per diem paid to physicians in this case would be $35.29 per hour, or
$123.55 per 3.5 hour period (compared to $300 in the observed contract), a reduction of 59%. Yet,
physician behaviour would also change substantially. The volume of services provided would not
decrease by as much as under the observed contract. Total services would decrease by 6.5% rela-
tive to FFS (rather than by 16% under the observed contract). The time spend at work would not
increase by as much as under the observed contract. Weekly hours would increase by 3% relative
to FFS (rather than an increase of 6.7% under the observed contract). The time spent per service
would therefore decrease (by 13 %) relative to the observed contract. This raises concerns over the
quality of services. If we interpret the time spent per service as a measure of quality, then the wel-
fare benefits of the constant-cost contract relative to the observed contract are not clear – services
increase but the quality of services goes down.
7 Conclusion
We have developed and estimated a structural labour supply model that incorporates work effort
into the standard consumption/leisure trade-off. This generates endogenous prices since effort af-
fects the opportunity cost of leisure and hours worked affect the marginal return to effort. Allowing
for choice among alternative contracts adds further non linearities as rational individuals locate on
the efficient budget constraint. We have applied our model to analyse the response of physicians
to changes in their compensation system, identifying parameters from the differing incentives be-
tween fee-for-service contracts and mixed-remuneration contracts as observed in the Province of
Quebec. Discretizing the choice set of physicians allows us to take account of non linearities in an
empirically tractable manner.
We have used our estimates to simulate the effects of alternative policies and compensation
systems, both on physician behaviour and costs. Our results suggest that incentives strongly affect
physicians’ work effort and the volume of services provided. The voluntary MR reform led to a
9% reduction in the volume of services provided. The effect on hours and weeks worked was less
pronounced: hours spent at work increased by 4% and the change in weeks worked was negligible.
A mandatory reform would have a substantially larger effect on behaviour: hours worked would
increase by 6.7%, services would decrease by 15% and time spent per service would increase by
16%. The cost per physician would increase by over 16%, largely due to the large per diem offered to
physicians, $300 per 3.5 hours. A constant-cost (mandatory) reform, setting the per diem to $123.55
49For a given per-diem, we calculate the implied probabilities of different practice alternatives. This implies an ex-
pected cost (income) which we compare to the cost under FFS. The numerical procedure iterates over the per-diem until
convergence is achieved.
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dollars per 3.5 hours would generate substantially smaller effects on physician behaviour: services
would decrease by 6.5%, hours worked would increase by 3% and time spent per service would
increase by 4.8%.
Our results have implications for the empirical application of labour supply models and data
gathering. They demonstrate the importance of extending traditional models to incorporate changes
on work effort, at least in the health-care sector. The physicians in our sample adjust their behaviour
much more in terms of the volume of services and effort than in terms of time spent at work. Ignor-
ing such changes would vastly misrepresent the effects of policies on the supply of health services.
Future work will benefit from additional data sets that incorporate information on both labour sup-
ply and work effort. Extending data sets to include information on health outcomes would also be
helpful. We have concentrated on the time spent per service as a measure of the quality of health
care. Matched physician-patient data sets, allowing researchers to follow patients through time
would allow researchers to compare health outcomes based on the payment system of physicians
permitting further advances in measuring the quality of health care.
Our paper also raises some modelling issues for physician labour supply and measuring treat-
ment effects. In developing our model we have assumed that physicians exercise complete control
over their practice environment, choosing both the number of services to supply and hours to work,
given exogenously determined prices. This makes sense within the context of publicly provided
health-care systems. Yet in market based systems the number of services provided and their prices
are subject to market forces. Extending the model to account for demand-side factors would allow
applications in market-oriented health care systems. We also ignore general-equilibrium effects in
our model. General-equilibrium effects would occur if, for example, there is a transfer of activities
between physicians who chose MR and those who remained on FFS. Economists have only recently
begun to extend structural models to account for general-equilibrium effects in policy evaluation
(see, for example, Lise, Seitz, and Smith, 2004); we leave this for future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Indexes
Quantities: Let pta stand for the price of the service a at time t and Ata,i for the number of a-type services a
physician i provided at time t. The annual level of services Ati is then measured as:
⎧⎨⎩
Ati = ∑a
Ata,i p
1996
a if 1996 ≤ t < 2000,
Ati = ∑a
(Ata,i p
2000
a )
∑
a
A2000a,i p
1996
a
∑
a
A2000a,i p
2000
a
if 2000 ≤ t ≤ 2002.
(29)
The same price are used for weighting billable and non-billable services. The variable Ati in (29) then
stands for either non-billable services, Ati = NBS
t
i , or billable ones, A
t
i = BS
t
i , aggregated using the same
price levels.
Prices: For the same reasons, the weights used for price indexes are the average level of services provided
by FFS physicians. This avoids incorporating into price measures the effect of the variations in services due
to switching to MR. Let Ata denote the average level of billable services of type a provided by all the FFS
physicians belonging to the specialty considered. The price index of services is then given by:
⎧⎨⎩
pt =
∑
a
A1996a pta
∑
a
A1996a p1996a
if 1996 ≤ t < 2000,
pt =
∑
a
A2000a pta
∑
a
A2000a p2000a
∑
a
A1996a p2000a
∑
a
A2000a p2000a
if 2000 ≤ t ≤ 2002.
(30)
Once again, we hold constant the weights used for measuring the price index under MR, PFt, since it is
calculated using the average billable services provided by FFS physicians, at MR reduced prices.
A.2 Caps
The ceiling does not apply to emergency from 1996 to 2001 whereas the hospital activities are excluded from
2001. Moreover, the income earned at private practice is decreased by a fixed proportion, denoted by a
(a = 35% for all specialities except diagnostic radiology, for which a = 75%) before cap application. Since
we do not distinguish practice based on the health care places where they take place, we cannot generate
consumption after the true ceiling. We instead adjust the caps so as to include the allocation of practice
between health care places. Let Rpi denote the income earned by physician i at private practice and R
e
i the
income apart for private practice included in the cap (except for emergency for 1996-2001, hospital since
2001). For each observation, we define the share of practice in each practice place as: sei = Ri/R
e
i and
spi = Ri/R
p
i where Ri is the observed total income for physician i. Denoting by C˜ the level of the cap for
the specialty the physician i belongs to, the physician’s income is subject to the cap if:
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sei .Ri + s
p
i .Ri(1− a) ≥ C˜ ⇔ Ri ≥
C˜
sei + s
p
i .(1− a)
≡ Ci.
This transformation provides us a cap on the whole income that incorporates practice allocation.
A.3 Non-Convex Budget Set
Let the budget set be given by
XM =
{
(X, e, h) ∈ R3 : X− peh− wh ≤ y, e ≥ 0, X ≥ 0
}
.
Let (Xo, eo, ho) and (X1, e1, h1) be on the frontier of XM with h1 > ho, e1 > eo and
Xo − peoho − who = X1 − pe1h1 − wh1 = y. (31)
For λ ∈ (0, 1), define
(X3, e3, h3) = λ(X1, e1, h1) + (1− λ)(Xo, eo, ho). (32)
Convexity requires
X3 − pe3h3 − wh3 ≤ y (33)
or,
λX1 + (1− λ)Xo − p
[
λe1 + (1− λ)eo
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
− w
[
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≤ y. (34)
But
y = λX1 + (1− λ)Xo −
[
λpe1h1 + (1− λ)peoho
]
−
[
λwh1 + (1− λ)who
]
. (35)
So (34) can be written
−p
[
λe1 + (1− λ)eo
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≤ −p
[
λe1h1 + (1− λ)eoho
]
[
λe1 + (1− λ)eo
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≥ λe1h1 + (1− λ)eoho
λ(λ− 1)e1h1 + λ(λ− 1)eoho ≥ λ(λ− 1)e1ho + λ(λ− 1)eoh1
e1h1 + eoho ≤ e1ho + eoh1(
e1 − eo
) (
h1 − ho
)
≤ 0.
(36)
But this contradicts h1 > ho, e1 > eo, so the budget set is not convex.
A.4 Equivalence
Let (X★, h★, e★) be the unique optimal vector that maximizes U(X, h, e) subject to (X, h, e) ∈ XM where
XM =
{
(X, e, h) ∈ R3 : X− pA− wh ≤ y, e ≥ 0, X ≥ 0, A = eh
}
.
Then (X★, h★, e★) satisfies
U(X★, h★, e★) > U(X′, h′, e′) ∀(X′, h′, e′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, e′) ∕= (X★, h★, e★) ⇐⇒
U(X★, h★, A★/h★) > U(X′, h′, A′/h′) ∀(X′, h′, e′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, e′) ∕= (X★, h★, e★) ⇐⇒
u(X★, h★, A★) > u(X′, h′, A′) ∀(X′, h′, e′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, e′) ∕= (X★, h★, e★) .
(37)
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A.5 Comparative Statics
To perform the comparative statics, we use the transformed utility function u = u(X, h, A). Assuming that
the second-order conditions are satisfied, let the expenditure function m(w, p, u¯) be the solution to the stan-
dard dual program min{X,h,A} X − wh − pA subject to u¯ − u(X, h, A) ≤ 0. In our case, the expenditure
function yields the minimum amount of non-labour income needed to get u¯ for given w and p.
Then, from Shephard’s Lemma,
∂m(w, p, u¯)
∂w
= −h˜(w, p, u¯)
∂m(w, p, u¯)
∂p
= −A˜(w, p, u¯).
(38)
Also, from the concavity of the expenditure function,
∂m(w, p, u¯)2
∂w2
= −∂h˜(w, p, u¯)
∂wˆ
≤ 0
∂m(w, p, u¯)2
∂p2
= −∂A˜(w, p, u¯)
∂ pˆ
≤ 0,
(39)
which demonstrates the inequalities (6).
Moreover, since the concavity of the expenditure function imposes no restrictions on the signs of the cross
derivatives in wage and price, one has
∂m(w, p, u¯)2
∂w∂p
= −∂h˜(w, p, u¯)
∂p
>
<
0, (40)
which demonstrates (7). Finally,
e˜(w, p, u¯) =
A˜(w, p, u¯)
h˜(w, p, u¯)
, (41)
from which
∂e˜(w, p, u¯)
∂p
=
h˜ ∂A˜∂p − A˜ ∂h˜∂p
h˜2
>
<
0, (42)
which demonstrates (8).
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